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Free energyThe slight perversion of the original title of this piece (The Future of the Bayesian Brain) reﬂects my attempt
to write prospectively about ‘Science and Stories’ over the past 20 years. I will meet this challenge by dealing
with the future and then turning to its history. The future of the Bayesian brain (in neuroimaging) is clear: it
is the application of dynamic causal modeling to understand how the brain conforms to the free energy prin-
ciple. In this context, the Bayesian brain is a corollary of the free energy principle, which says that any self
organizing system (like a brain or neuroimaging community) must maximize the evidence for its own exis-
tence, which means it must minimize its free energy using a model of its world. Dynamic causal modeling in-
volves ﬁnding models of the brain that have the greatest evidence or the lowest free energy. In short, the
future of imaging neuroscience is to reﬁne models of the brain to minimize free energy, where the brain re-
ﬁnes models of the world to minimize free energy. This endeavor itself minimizes free energy because our
community is itself a self organizing system. I cannot imagine an alternative future that has the same beau-
tiful self consistency as mine. Having dispensed with the future, we can now focus on the past, which is much
more interesting:
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Ahistory of scientiﬁc ideas is a history of people.What follows is a se-
ries of anecdotes about the people who have shaped our current think-
ing about the brain and, in particular the Bayesian brain. This is
necessarily a personal account and some of the anecdotes may or
may not be true but they are at least colorful. It should be noted that
this account is just one of many perspectives on the Bayesian brain. Fur-
thermore, I have tried to give this account an autobiographical narrative,
which means the stories (and their characters) are somewhat selective. license.Prologue
For me, the story starts when I was 8 years old. Mymother had sent
me outside to play in one of those hot summers of the 1960s. In a Gerald
Durrell moment I overturned an old log and found myself absorbed in
the antics of some woodlice (miniature armadillo-like bugs) that were
ﬂeeing for cover of darkness. After a fewminutes observing them close-
ly I hadmy ﬁrst (and possibly last) scientiﬁc insight: theywere not pur-
posefully (mindfully) seeking darkness, theywere simplymoving faster
(in any random direction) when warmed by the sun. Over the next
40 years, I was to drawon this early notionwhen learning about natural
selection, information theory, machine learning and statistical thermo-
dynamics.What follows is a story about some of the people in these dis-
ciplines who gave us the Bayesian brain.
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To understand the role of the Bayesian brain in imaging neurosci-
ence, it is necessary to unpack the ideas that it entails. In essence, the
Bayesian brain says that we are trying to infer the causes of our sen-
sations based on a generative model of the world. This idea has a
long history dating back to the students of Plato and probably most
clearly articulated by von Helmholtz (1866). The idea has gathered
momentum over the past century, as reﬂected in the notion of per-
ception as hypothesis testing (Gregory, 1968, 1980; Kersten et al.,
2004) and the central role of Bayesian probability theory in computa-
tional neuroscience (Dayan et al., 1995; Lee andMumford, 2003). Par-
ticular instances of the Bayesian brain, such as predictive coding (Rao
and Ballard, 1998) and optimal decision (game) theory in neuroeco-
nomics have now come to dominate much of neuroscience at the sys-
tems level (Knill and Pouget, 2004), particularly in functional
imaging. It is important to appreciate that the Bayesian brain hypoth-
esis is just a description of optimal behavior: it does not prescribe
how Bayes optimal perception, sensorimotor integration or
decision-making under uncertainty emerges. To understand this one
has to look at the functional architecture of the brain. Perhaps one
of the most remarkable aspects of this architecture is its connectivity.
But why does the brain have (axonal and synaptic) connections?
Many other functionally specialized organs like the liver or blood do
not have a delicate connectivity, so why does the brain? The answer,
from point of view of the Bayesian brain, is straightforward: if the
brain is making inferences about the causes of its sensations then it
must have a model of the causal relationships (connections) among
(hidden) states of the world that cause sensory input. It follows that
neuronal connections encode (model) causal connections that con-
spire to produce sensory information. This is an important point, be-
cause it means that to understand the Bayesian brain one needs to
understand connectivity and the distributed processing that it sup-
ports. In short, the Bayesian brain entails an understanding of connec-
tivity and, by implication, functional integration in the brain. This
understanding is informed by the fact that functional integration
must be optimizing something, in the sense that the Bayesian brain
hypothesis just says that perception and decision making are (ap-
proximately) Bayes optimal. This is where my story starts, namely,
with the inception of functional integration and the attending notion
of optimization:
Prehistory: the functional integration club
In 1990, 2 years into my ﬁrst research appointment at the MRC Cy-
clotron Unit in London, I received a phone call from Semir Zeki who
asked, “what do you think about integration?” It was an odd question,
which I answered politely, from a mathematical perspective. Semir
Zeki had just completed a successful collaboration with our ﬂedging
(PET) neuroimaging group at the MRC, establishing functional segre-
gation in the human brain using a visual activation paradigm (Lueck
et al., 1989). Semir Zeki was (and is) a world-renowned visual neuro-
scientist, whose physical stature and childlike delight in conceptual
challenges are at odds with his intellectual largesse and wisdom
(for many, Semir Zeki is the father of modern functional segregation
in the brain). Semir has a provocative mischief about him that is im-
possible to resist. In this instance, Semir wanted to invite Richard
Frackowiak and me to a ‘functional integration club’ he had conceived
with Horace Barlow. Horace Barlow was an established and respected
theoretician, probably most famous for his principle of maximum ef-
ﬁciency (or minimum redundancy) that casts perception in terms of
information theory (Barlow, 1961). This club was a remarkable expe-
rience for Richard and me (in our late 30s and 20s respectively) and
my ﬁrst exposure to deep conversations about how the brain worked.
We met sporadically, in UCL common rooms populated with Formica-
topped tables and discarded blackboards or (my favorite) rooms inCambridge with an old perfume of leather armchair and pipe
smoke. The conversation was informal (although I hardly spoke be-
cause I was intimidated by Horace Barlow's authority and the fact
that he only seemed to smile with his eyes) and wide ranging as
was the group's membership. It included people like Graeme Mitchi-
son and a protégé of Horace Barlow's, Peter Földiák. Graeme Mitchi-
son was among the ﬁrst people to propose an optimality criterion
for cortical wiring lengths in the cortex (Durbin and Mitchison,
1990), a theme that resurfaces every few years and has become
more acute recently with graph theoretical analyses of connectivity
data. I remember Graeme showing us his simulations with a gentle
and repressed excitement in a tiny ofﬁce that was dwarfed by a
(moderate sized and probably arcane) computer. Peter Földiák went
on to become one of the key players in information theoretic formu-
lations of visual processing and the importance of lateral brain con-
nections in forming orthogonal (sparse) representations (Földiák,
1990). There were many themes discussed in these meetings that
have stayed with me for decades. From the point of view of this
story, the two key themes were the distinction between functional
segregation and functional integration and the notion of optimality.
I do not know how or why Semir and Horace chose that group (or
that time) to have these seemingly undirected discussions but, from
my point of view, they were visionary. First, the dialectic between
the brain's attempt to segregate and integrate neatly accommodated
our empirical efforts to analyze neuroimaging data in terms of region-
ally speciﬁc activations and their interactions mediated by effective
connectivity (the former becoming Statistical Parametric Mapping
and the latter Dynamic Causal Modeling). The notion of optimization
was, theoretically, central here; whether it was the optimization of
cortical wiring lengths or mutual information between sensory
input and neuronal responses, the underlying message was that the
brain was optimal in some sense. But what was being optimized?
Whatever the answer, it was clear from Horace Barlow's work that
it should be quantiﬁed in terms of information theory or, more sim-
ply, probability measures. At this stage, Bayes optimality was not an
accepted currency in these conversations and it would be two de-
cades before the equivalence between principle of minimum redun-
dancy and Bayesian treatments of sensory processing would become
formally apparent (at least to me; Friston, 2010). When one thinks
about optimality in decision making and motor control, one usually
turns to optimal control theory. This brings us to next part of my
story and the other side of the Bayesian brain, namely, optimal deci-
sion theory and value learning. However, my introduction to this
was not straightforward.
History: optimality, natural selection and value
Twenty years ago, I was seconded to the Neurosciences Institute
under the Directorship of Gerry Edelman. The Neurosciences Institute
is associated with the Neuroscience Research Program (founded in
1962, a few years before the Society for Neuroscience in 1969).
Gerry Edelman is an enigmatic Nobel laureate probably most famous
in theoretical neuroscience for Neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1993).
Marc Raichle once described Gerry Edelman as a “complicated
man.” Marc said this with a smile that belied the kindness of his de-
scription. In fact, Edelman was (is) a brilliant man with an incisive
(invasive) manner that is almost malignant. The atmosphere the Neu-
rosciences Institute was a world away from the armchairs of Cam-
bridge. It was exhilarating and oppressive, echoing its Manhattan
environs (before the days of zero tolerance). Edelman himself had
an incredible presence and imbued our working atmosphere with
an almost homophilic intensity. He had a remarkable and unique per-
spective on the natural world, which he articulated with nuance and
craft. I recall daily lunches in New York cafes, enthralled by his in-
sights and stories. I heard many years later, from Read Montague,
that even his jokes were crafted—Read found him memorizing “One
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nal ﬂight. Whether this is true or not, I do not know but it speaks to
the fact that impresarios like Edelman (and many others in this
story) are never quite what they seem.
It is remarkable that Edelman attracted young people who have
become so prominent in our ﬁeld (and in this story). On arriving, I
replaced Read Montague, who had just left under some deliciously
unspeciﬁed ‘dark cloud.’ Read had been working on theories of
value and optimization, in the context of neuronal group selection.
This theory rests on the notion that selective pressure could optimize
cortical wiring and connectivity to form neuronal groups (or assem-
blies); in the same way that natural selection operates on phenotypes
in evolution. Read went on to publish, with Peter Dayan and others,
seminal work linking dopamine ﬁring to value learning (Montague
et al., 1995). Interestingly, as I write this, Read is settling into his
new ofﬁce next to mine and Peter Dayan is now Director of the Gatsby
Computational Neuroscience Unit next door, which we will come to
later. When I arrived, two key young men were Giulio Tononi and
Olaf Sporns. Again, it is remarkable that these two scientists have
now become world leaders in their own right, Giulio in the context
of consciousness and sleep research, while Olaf invented the connec-
tome (Sporns et al., 2005) and is now a key player in our community.
I remember clearly Olaf describing his ambition to use empirical con-
nectivity data to understand the complexity of neuronal dynamics on
these structures in 1994. Giulio's work on complexity (Tononi et al.,
1994) again addressed the fundamental dialectic between functional
segregation and integration and how one can be accommodated opti-
mally in the context of the other. I have often wondered whether the
focus on this issue reﬂected in some way the early friendship be-
tween Semir Zeki and Gerry Edelman, which, like all true passions,
turned into something much darker and enduring.
As a student of probability theory and quantum physics at Cam-
bridge, I had assumed that all formal theories should, ultimately, be
cast in mathematical terms. Edelman, on the other hand, considered
this as ‘mathematosis’ and about as desirable as halitosis. When I
pointed out, at an early group meeting, the formal links between
value learning and dynamic programming there was genuine fear
and horror in the room about how Edelman would respond. His re-
sponse was to rusticate me to the library for a period of 6 months.
My task was to sanitize my thinking and immerse myself in the writ-
ings of the great biological thinkers from Charles Darwin to Ernst
Mayr. I complied with this formative (if somewhat brutal) therapy.
Six months later, Edelman presented me with a copy of Mayr's ‘The
Growth of Biological Thought’ (1982), which I still treasure today.
We then wrote on the neurobiology of value learning (with all the
maths in an Appendix; Friston et al., 1994). In one sense, Edelman
was right; the deep questions about optimality were embedded in
selectionist thinking, population dynamics and self organization.
However, his puritanical convictions left others to meet the challenge
of relating value to more formal treatments in information and prob-
ability theory. An approach one could now understand as the Bayes-
ian brain. This brings us to the mid 90s and the rise of Bayesian
thinking:
The Bayesian paradigm
We now move on to 1994, which found me back in London at the
opening of the Functional Imaging Laboratory at Queen square (that
Richard Frackowiak had moved from the MRC Unit at the Hammer-
smith Hospital). This was an exciting time: Tim Shallice had overseen
the inception of the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, which co-
occupied a neighboring building with the Gatsby Computational Neu-
roscience Unit, directed by Geoffrey Hinton. Like Semir Zeki, Geoffrey
Hinton exudes a sense of childlike enthusiasm for new insights and
conceptual toys. His lectures were considered and profoundly engag-
ing but could not disguise a breathless impatience to get to the point.For me, and I suspect many others, Geoffrey Hinton's ideas placed the
Bayesian brain center stage in a tangible and formal fashion. In more
general terms, Bayesian formulations of problems in machine learn-
ing provided an inescapable metaphor for neuronal computations
(e.g., Hinton and van Camp 1993). Notions like the Helmholtz ma-
chine and the central role of generative models not only became a
natural way of thinking about the brain but also prescribed a princi-
pled approach to data analysis, particularly in the context of the ill
posed problems we were dealing with at that time. Geoffrey Hinton
presented himself with an infectious exuberance but there was also
a touch of pathos about him. One story, which I cannot forget, is
that he became increasingly unhappy living in London: he had chosen
to live in a culturally lively part of town, which the inhabitants of his
building chose to celebrate with loud parties that were not sympa-
thetic to the needs of a quiet academic. Hinton's solution to this was
to build himself a room within a room; a soundproof cage, within
which he slept. Here was a man who had an inventive approach to
life's little problems. This inventiveness is clearly apparent in the
long history of his contributions to machine learning and computa-
tional neuroscience. He was deeply committed to the Bayesian per-
spective and a great advocate for generative models. A more subtle
but terribly important contribution was to cast the generally intracta-
ble problem of Bayesian inference in terms of optimization. The in-
sight here was that the same problems that Richard Feynman
(1972) had solved in statistical physics, using path integral formula-
tions and variational calculus could be applied to the problem of
Bayesian inference, namely, how to evaluate the evidence for a
model. This is where free energy minimization comes in, the sense
that minimizing free energy is equivalent to (approximately) maxi-
mizing the evidence for a model. Note again the underlying role of
optimization, which here ﬁnessed a difﬁcult but fundamental prob-
lem in Bayesian inference.
I remember the last time I spoke to Geoffrey Hinton before his re-
turn to Toronto (leaving Peter Dayan in charge of the Gatsby). I do not
remember why I went to his ofﬁce (I suspect he had forgotten why he
asked me). He was clearly very excited and spent an hour trying to
explain a new approach to unsupervised learning based upon prod-
ucts of experts (Hinton, 2002). I left with my head spinning and a
sense that I should try and reciprocate his intellectual generosity. I
wrote to him shortly after, trying to summarize my thoughts on bio-
logical minimization of free energy. I never heard from him, probably
because of his return to Canada that was somewhat complicated by
his refusal to ﬂy in airplanes. The notes I sent him were eventually
published as the free energy principle about 4 years later (Friston,
2005).
Bayesian brain and optimization
So how do the legacies of functional integration, information the-
ory, value learning and free energy minimization constitute a history
of the Bayesian brain in imaging? The answer lies in optimization: all
four perspectives rest on optimizing a single quantity-evidence. In in-
formation theory, this corresponds to maximizing the mutual infor-
mation between sensory information and internal representations;
in value learning and selection, the optimization is in terms of value
or adaptive ﬁtness, while free energy minimization optimizes the ev-
idence or marginal likelihood of a model. All these processes are the
same thing. In other words, maximizing the evidence for a model
maximizes the mutual information between successive samples and
internal representations (under complexity constraints). This is ex-
actly consistent with the principles of maximum efﬁciency or mini-
mum redundancy (complexity). But why would Bayesian model
evidence be equivalent to adaptive ﬁtness or value? The answer
is simple but abstract and again calls on information theory and sta-
tistical physics: it turns out that time average of Bayesian model evi-
dence is the same as the (negative) entropy of sensory data sampled
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evidence is implicitly trying to minimize its entropy. In other words, it
resists the second law of thermodynamics and provides a principled
explanation for self organization in the face of a natural tendency to
disorder. This means the Bayesian brain gracefully accommodates en-
semble or population dynamics in evolutionary thinking within a sta-
tistical framework. In functionalist terms, such a self organizing
system that minimizes its entropy would appear to be making Bayes-
ian inferences about its sensory exchanges with the environment,
which, of course, is just the Bayesian brain hypothesis. So is this the
end of the story?Epilogue
This is not the end of the story but probably its beginning. It is one
thing to understand the fundamental imperative that lies behind the
Bayesian brain. It is another to understand how selective pressures at
an evolutionary and somatic timescale have shaped its anatomy and
physiology to meet this imperative. In short, we come back to the na-
ture of functional integration. There are many compelling schemes
that may implement the Bayesian brain. Perhaps the most popular
is predictive coding, in which bottom-up prediction errors (reporting
on those parts of sensory information that have yet to be explained)
are suppressed by top-down predictions (Mumford, 1992). In this
context, prediction error can be regarded as free energy, such that
minimizing free energy is effectively the same as minimizing predic-
tion error. There are all sorts of interesting issues that arise from these
considerations, such as the use of hierarchical models and their rela-
tionship to the functional logic of cortical connections (e.g., Zeki and
Shipp 1988). However, I am approaching my word limit for this
essay and it is time to close, where it started.
To understand the mechanisms behind the Bayesian brain, one
needs to characterize and quantify the underlying message passing
and neuronal infrastructures. In other words, the challenge ahead re-
mains one of functional integration and the measurement of effective
connectivity. This has been the focus of many researchers over the
past decade and, as intimated in the abstract, appeals to exactly the
same principles that underlie Bayes optimality per se. This goes be-
yond dynamic causal modeling and covers any (Bayesian) evidence-
based modeling scheme we apply to neuroimaging data. However,
the history of functional and effective connectivity in neuroimaging
is another story with its own characters, which can be found in the
other articles of this special issue.
I appreciate that I have only covered the ﬁrst 10 (of the 20) years
properly and that I have omitted many important people and issues.
However, the next part of the story of the Bayesian brain, alongwith all its architects, is probably best left for the ‘Future of the Histo-
ry of the Bayesian Brain.’
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